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?????? 
本文發展一個垂直產品差異化模型，分
別觀察在 Cournot 數量競爭及 Bertrand 價格
競爭下，不同貿易出口國之間最適貿易政策
與產品品質的相互關係。我們可以使用這個
品質模型去解釋為什麼高生產成本的日本傾
向給予它的出口商較高的補貼。這個案例是
de Meza(1986)及出口補貼策略理論所無法解
釋的。 
 
Abstract 
This paper presents a vertical product 
differentiation model to examine the 
relationship between optimal trade policies and 
product qualities for different export countries 
under Cournot quantity competition as well as 
Bertrand price competition. We can also use 
this quality model to explain why Japan as a 
high production-cost country tends to offer 
high subsidies. This is a case that cannot be 
explained by de Meza (1986) and the strategic 
theory of export subsidies. 
 
 
??????? 
The purpose of this paper is to present a 
vertical product differentiation model to 
examine the relationship between optimal trade 
policies and product qualities for different 
export countries under Cournot quantity 
competition as well as Bertrand price 
competition. We shall also use this quality 
model to explain why Japan as a high 
production-cost country tends to offer high 
subsidies.  This is a case that cannot be 
explained by de Meza (1986) and the strategic 
theory of export subsidies. 
??????? 
   Consider a duopoly model in which a single 
home firm, firm 1, and a foreign firm, firm 2, 
produce vertically differentiated products and 
engage in Cournot quantity or Bertrand price 
competition in a third-country market. Assume 
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that each consumer in the third market can buy 
at most one unit of the vertically differentiated 
product and that the utility function of a 
representative consumer is specified as follows: 
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where U is separable in quality and price, and 
should be thought of as the surplus derived 
from the consumption of the product; qi 
( )2,1=i  is a positive real number that 
describes the quality of the good i; θ  is a 
positive real number serving as a taste 
parameter which is uniformly distributed in the 
interval [ ]θθ ,  with unit density.  
For simplicity, consider qualities 1q  and 2q  
to be fixed and assume that firm 1 is a high 
quality good producer and firm 2 a low quality 
producer so that 21 qq > . The consumer 
indifferent between buying good 1 and good 2 
has a taste parameter 1θ  such that 
221111 pqpq −=− θθ  or equivalently 
21
21
1 qq
pp
−
−
=θ . On the other hand, the consumer 
indifferent between buying the low quality 
good and not buying at all has the taste 
parameter θ2  such that θ2q2 − p2 = 0  or 
equivalentlyθ2 =
p2
q2
. Given the above setting, 
the demand functions facing the high and low 
quality firms are given, respectively, by: 
x1(p1,p2)=θ −θ1=θ −
p1−p2
q1−q2
=
1
A
(θ A−p1+p2)      (2) 
x2(p1,p2)=θ1−θ2=
p1−p2
q1−q2
−
p2
q2
=
1
Aq2
(q2p1−q1p2)      (3) 
where A ≡ q1 − q2 > 0. 
From (2) and (3), the inverse demand 
functions are derivable as follows: 
p1(x1, x2) = q1(θ − x1) − q2x2             (4) 
p2(x1,x2) = q2(θ − x1 − x2)               (5) 
These demand functions will be used to 
derive market equilibrium for Cournot quantity 
and Bertrand price competition. 
Under Cournot Competition, the profit 
functions of the two firms are given by: 
π1(x1,x2)= p1x1−c1x1+s1x1= q1(θ −x1)−q2x2[ ]x1−c1x1+s1x1    (6) 
π2(x1,x2)= p2x2−c2x2+s2x2 = q2(θ −x1−x2)[ ]x2−c2x2+s2x2    (7) 
where ci is the constant marginal cost and si 
is the per unit subsidy. 
    The Cournot equilibrium must satisfy: 
π1
1
= p1 − q1x1 − c1 − s1 = 0                (8) 
π 2
2
= p2 − q2x2 − c2 − s2 = 0               
Assuming the second-order and stability 
conditions to be met, we can solve 
simultaneously for the equilibrium outputs as 
if the consumer buys a unit
of the ith product with
quality qi at price pi 
(9)
If the consumer does not buy
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x1=x1(s1,s2,c1,c2,q1,q2) and x2 = x2(s1,s2,c1,c2,q1,q2). 
Turning to the first stage game, the welfare 
levels of the domestic and foreign countries are 
defined as: 
W1 = π1 − s1x1                       (10) 
W2 = π 2 − s2x2                       (11) 
Then we have: 
s1 − s2 =
q2
2q1 − q2
(p1 − c1) − (p2 − c2)[ ]     
To relate our result to de Meza’s, we let 
(s1 − s2) = 0 in equation (12) to figure out the 
(s1 − s2) = 0 curve on the space of (c1,q1)  as 
shown in Figure 1. Since s1 − s2 = 0, it follows 
from (12) that (q1x1 − q2x2) = 0. By noting that 
x1 = x1(c1,q1)  and x2 = x2(c1,q1) , we 
differentiate totally this relation with respect to 
c1 and q1 to yield: 
dq1
dc1
=
2q1q2 + q2
2
θ (2q1q2 + q22) − 3x1q22
> 0          (13) 
Equation (13) indicates that the 
(s1 − s2) = 0 curve is positively sloped, passing 
through the point (c2
*,q2
*). Any point locating 
below the curve has s1 < s2, indicating that de 
Meza’s principle that the country with the 
lowest costs will set the highest subsidies holds 
true. However, any point locating above the 
curve (i.e., the shaded area in Figure 1) has the 
value of s1 > s2, showing that the country with 
highest costs (and highest qualities) will set the 
highest subsidies, which appears at odds with 
de Meza's principle. Most importantly, these 
results can be used not only to explain why 
some less efficient countries often tend to offer 
the greater subsidies, but also to explain why a 
high-quality country, like Japan, pays high 
subsidies. 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under Bertrand price competiton we can define 
the profit functions of the two firms as follows: 
π1(p1,p2)=(p1−c1+s1)x1=
1
A
(p1−c1+s1)(θ A−p1+ p2)   (14) 
(12)
  s1 > s2 
s1 < s2 
s1 = s2
(c2*,q2*)
Figure 1  Cost/Quality Combinations Yielding the 
Same or Different Subsidy Rates: The Cournot  
Case 
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(p2 − c2) − (p1 − c1)[ ]          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equation (16) shows that the greater the profit 
margin of the domestic firm, the larger is the 
welfare gain to the domestic country from an 
export tax. This seems to imply that the country 
with the lowest cost will offer the highest tax. 
To gain more insight, we let (s1 − s2) = 0 and 
draw the (s1 − s2) = 0  curve on the space of 
(c1,q1) .  Totally differentiating the 
(s1 − s2) = 0 curve with respect to c1 and q1 and 
proceeding as before, we can show that 
(dq1/dc1) > 0 which indicates that the 
(s1 − s2) = 0 curve is positively sloped, passing 
through the point (c2*, q2*) as shown in Figure 
2. Any point locating below the curve has s1 > 
s2 (or t1 < t2), while any point locating above 
the curve has s1 < s2 (or t1 > t2), where ti (i = 1,2) 
denotes the export tax on firm i. Comparing 
points A and B, for example, we see that for 
any given q1, an increase in c1 reduces the unit 
profit margin of the high-quality firm relative 
to that of the low-quality firm. As the profit 
margin declines, the high quality firm’s 
government should impose a low export tax. 
For a given c1 at point B, by comparison, an 
increase in q1 (up to say point C) tends to 
increase the high-quality firm’s profit margin, 
thereby calling for a high tax or low subsidy. 
  
四、計劃成果自評 
Our findings not only support some 
empirical evidence that the less efficient 
countries often tend to offer the greater 
subsidies; it can also explain why a 
high-quality country, like Japan, pays high 
subsidies. 
Our study not only contribute to the 
literature, but also provides some policy 
implications for decision-makers. We wish to 
publish our work in international journal. 
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